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TONTINES FOR THE INVINCIBLES: ENTICING LOW 
RISKS INTO THE HEALTH-INSURANCE POOL WITH AN 
IDEA FROM INSURANCE HISTORY AND BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 
TOM BAKER* AND PETER SIEGELMAN** 
 
 Over one-third of the uninsured adults in the U.S. below retirement 
age are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old. Young adults, 
especially men, often go without insurance, even when buying it is 
mandatory and sometimes even when it is a low-cost employment benefit. 
This Article proposes a new form of health insurance targeted at this group, 
the “young invincibles”—those who (wrongly) believe that they do not need 
health insurance because they will not get sick. Our proposal offers a cash 
bonus to those who turn out to be right in their belief that they did not really 
need health insurance. The concept comes from the tontine life insurance 
that fueled the rise of the U.S. insurance industry in the late nineteenth 
century. A largely forgotten casualty of the 1906 “pacification” of the life-
insurance industry, the tontine idea holds great promise for making health 
insurance attractive to the invincibles. The tontine feature frames the health-
insurance purchase as a smart investment, rather than a way to spend 
money for something the customer does not think he needs. Tontines make 
insurance more attractive to the uninsured, without wasting funds by 
subsidizing those who are already covered. We identify a particular class of 
individuals (the invincibles), show how a specific cognitive bias accounts 
for their irrational behavior, and design an insurance mechanism (tontines 
or deferred dividends) to overcome the effects of this bias. The final 
sections of the Article offer an empirically calibrated pricing demonstration 
for a tontine health policy and an analysis of the legality of tontines in this 
context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 They’re young and healthy, and insurance is expensive. As 
long as they don’t . . . slip on the ice, crash a bike, 
snowboard into a tree, rupture an appendix, or get hit by a 
bus, everything will be fine. Right? 1 
 
 
 1. David Amsden, The Young Invincibles, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 2, 2007, at 26. 
See also Cara Buckley, For Uninsured Young Adults: Do-It-Yourself Medical Care, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1. 
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Over one-third of all uninsured adults below retirement age in the 
U.S. are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old.2 When young 
adults, especially men, age out of the dependent-care coverage provided 
by their parents’ employment benefits or public health insurance, they 
often go without, even when buying insurance is mandatory and 
sometimes even when that insurance is a low-cost employment benefit.3 
In health policy parlance, these people are known as the “young 
invincibles,” and are considered unreachable by ordinary health 
insurance. Young adults grow older, and most of them eventually join 
the health-insurance pool.4 But some of them face serious medical needs 
during that uninsured period, and their lack of insurance for those 
needs imposes costs on others in society—not to mention the 
consequences for the young adults themselves.5 
Health-care policy-makers have suggested a number of ways to 
keep young adults in the health-insurance pool. Most obviously, a 
universal health-insurance program would achieve this objective. Other 
more targeted, incremental approaches include requiring employers to 
increase the maximum age of children who may be covered under their 
parent’s health-care benefits and increasing the maximum age for 
 
 2. Jennifer L. Kriss et al., Rite of Passage? Why Young Adults Become 
Uninsured and How New Policies Can Help, 38 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 fig.1 
(2008) (citation omitted) (reporting that 29 percent of non-elderly uninsured are from 
nineteen to twenty-nine years of age). Using their data, we compute that 37 percent of 
the uninsured non-elderly adults are from nineteen to twenty-nine years of age. 
 3. Sally H. Adams et al., Health Insurance Across Vulnerable Ages: Patterns 
and Disparities from Adolescence to the Early 30s, 119 PEDIATRICS e1033, e1034, 
e1038 (2007), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/119/5/e1033; S. 
Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper, Gender and Uninsurance Among Young Adults 
in the United States, 113 PEDIATRICS 291 (2004) [hereinafter Callahan & Cooper, 
Gender and Uninsurance ]; S. Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper, Uninsurance and 
Health Care Access Among Young Adults in the United States, 116 PEDIATRICS 88, 88, 
90, 93–94 (2005) [hereinafter Callahan & Cooper, Uninsurance and Health Care 
Access ]. For evidence that Massachusetts’s health-insurance mandate has reduced the 
incidence of uninsurance among young adults (at the cost of some coercion), but has 
left a significant fraction still uninsured, see Paul Wingle, Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector Authority, Presentation to Academy Health National Health Policy 
Conference on Young and Uninsured (Feb. 4, 2008) (slides and handout available at 
http://www.academyhealth/org/Events/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1512).  
 4. See Adams et al., supra note 3, at e1036, e1038. 
 5. See, e.g., KARYN SCHWARTZ & TANYA SCHWARTZ, UNINSURED YOUNG 
ADULTS: A PROFILE AND OVERVIEW OF COVERAGE OPTIONS 6, 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7785.pdf (discussing the welfare consequences of 
uninsurance, and the case for reducing it); S. Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper, 
Access to Health Care for Young Adults With Disabling Chronic Conditions, 160 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 178, 181 (2006). 
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participation in state-based public insurance programs.6 All of these are 
costly and involve an element of coercion. 
Instead of forcing them to buy something they do not value, or 
making others subsidize that purchase, we suggest designing a product 
that the young invincibles would be more willing to pay for. “One size 
fits all” only rarely attracts consumers who have choices. Insurance 
history and behavioral decision research suggest that insurance is just 
like other consumer products or services in this regard. Different 
people have different preferences for insurance. Designing new 
insurance products to meet insurance-resistant young people’s 
preferences offers a potentially promising new way to entice low risks 
into the health-insurance pool. 
To this end, we propose tontines for the invincibles—health 
insurance that pays a cash bonus to those who turn out to be right in 
their belief that they did not really need health insurance. The simplest 
arrangement would award the bonus to those who did not consume 
more than a threshold value of medical care during a three-year period, 
potentially excluding preventive care. We discuss more complicated 
arrangements below. 
The tontine concept comes from the tontine life insurance that 
fueled the rise of the U.S. insurance industry in the late nineteenth 
century.7 Late nineteenth-century insurers seem to have understood 
some things about human nature that were largely forgotten over the 
intervening hundred years, only to be rediscovered more recently under 
the aegis of behavioral economics. Tontine life insurance paid a 
deferred dividend to policyholders who survived and faithfully paid 
their insurance premiums for a defined period, usually twenty years.8 
The amount of the dividend depended on how many people were left in 
the insurance pool when the dividend was paid.9 A largely forgotten 
casualty of the 1906 pacification of the life-insurance industry, the 
tontine idea holds great promise for making health insurance attractive 
to the invincibles today.10 
 
 6. Id. at 7–8, 12–13; Kriss et al., supra note 2, at 13–15. 
 7. Henry William Manly, On the American Tontine and Mutual Assessment 
Schemes, 26 J. INST. ACTUARIES 182, 183–84 (1887).  
 8. Id. at 184–85. 
 9. Id. at 183–85. 
 10. Products that offer a link between insurance or savings and probabilistic 
prizes are not entirely dead. For more than fifty years, the government of the United 
Kingdom has offered a Premium Bond program that “guarantee[s] holders risk-free 
return of nominal principal” while paying a return that is “distributed to holders each 
month by a lottery-like mechanism.” PETER TUFANO, SAVING WHILST GAMBLING: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF UK PREMIUM BONDS 1 (2008), available at http://www. 
aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2008/2008_541.pdf. The bond has successful parallels 
in some third-world countries. Id. 
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There are, of course, many reasons why everyone should buy life, 
health, and other kinds of insurance.11 But those reasons appeal to 
rational, prudent people, and especially to the homo economicus who 
populates traditional economic analysis. Insurance-resistant young 
adults belong to another tribe, at least when it comes to health 
insurance. They are “Humans,” not “Econs,” in Richard Thaler and 
Cass Sunstein’s evocative terms; like other Humans, the invincibles 
predictably err in ways we can understand and for which we can plan.12 
Like other forms of choice architecture, our health-insurance idea is a 
“nudge,” a menu-changing strategy that may help Humans make wise 
choices.13 
Tontine health insurance would differ from ordinary health 
insurance or managed care in one main respect. Ordinary health 
insurance provides a tangible benefit only when you need health care. 
Tontine insurance would provide a tangible benefit even if you do not. 
We emphasize tangible benefits because the intangible peace of mind 
that insurance provides is demonstrably not enough to induce the young 
invincibles to insure. A tontine health-insurance policy would pay them 
a cash benefit when they do not use their health insurance, as well as 
covering their medical expenses when they do. 
The tontine feature frames the health-insurance purchase as a smart 
investment, rather than as a way to spend money for something the 
customer thinks he does not need. Indeed, the tontine feature provides 
something close to the holy grail of health-policy planners: making 
insurance more attractive to the uninsured without “wasting” funds by 
subsidizing those who are already covered. The tontine has a role even 
if Congress adopts universal-coverage health-care reform. Offering the 
tontine would make it more likely that young invincibles would actually 
enroll and remain in the program. 
A growing body of work uses behavioral insights to explain 
insurance demand. An early example is Eisner and Strotz’s paper 
detailing the irrationality of flight insurance, which should not have 
appealed to a rational consumer, yet was widely purchased.14 Johnson 
 
 11. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, Uncertainty and Medical Care, in ESSAYS 
IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 200–01 (1971) (full insurance is optimal when 
insurance is actuarially fair); Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 533, 557 (1968) (same). 
 12. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8 (2008) (contrasting “Econs” 
and “Humans”).  
 13. See id. at 3–6, 8. 
 14. Robert Eisner & Robert H. Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of 
Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355, 355, 364 (1961). Flight insurance remains far more 
common than insurance economists believe. It has become less visible because the 
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et al., used experimental and anecdotal evidence to show that people 
are willing to pay more for separate policies covering two risks 
individually than for a single policy covering both of them together 
(presumably because the separate events are more vivid).15 
In recent work, Kunreuther and Pauly offer an extended taxonomy 
of anomalies in insurance decision-making on both the demand and 
supply side of the market, including consumers’ preference for 
insurance policies that offer premium rebates, a concept that is similar 
to our tontine idea.16 Their trenchant policy suggestions include 
redesigning insurance coverage to make it more attractive to those who 
“mistakenly” choose not to purchase it.17 Our work is also in the spirit 
of recent papers in the behavioral economics of health and health 
insurance. We share the conclusion of Jeffrey Liebman and Richard 
Zeckhauser,18 and Richard G. Frank,19 that decisions regarding health 
insurance and health care are precisely the kinds of choices that are 
likely to be made poorly, and that insights from behavioral economics 
can be used to justify institutional design in this area. 
The idea that an overly optimistic assessment of risk stands as an 
obstacle to effective demand for health insurance is by now quite 
standard.20 Our contribution is to identify a particular class of 
individuals (the “young invincibles”) subject to this bias, and to design 
a novel insurance mechanism (tontines or deferred dividends) to 
overcome its effects. In addition we identify the potential use of 
 
airport kiosks of a previous generation have been replaced by automatic flight insurance 
arrangements sold through credit cards. See Aviation Data, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (describing flight 
and baggage insurance program in the context of a consumer class action). 
 15. See generally Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and 
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993). 
 16. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and 
Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 63, 91–92 (2006). 
See also David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the 
Practice of Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 
(Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004).  
 17. Kunruether & Pauly, supra note 16. 
 18. Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex 
Insurance, Subtle Subsidies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14330, 2008). 
 19. Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 4, 28 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10881, 2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10881. 
 20. See, e.g., Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60 
ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1236 (1992). For a recent appraisal of the evidence on optimism 
bias, see Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, The Overconfidence Problem in 
Insurance Markets (Econ. Learning & Soc. Evolution, Working Paper No. 116, 2004), 
available at http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/squintani/overconfidence.pdf.  
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deferred dividends to address ex post moral hazard in health insurance, 
although we defer thorough exploration of this topic to future work. 
There are some tricky issues to address in designing a tontine 
health-insurance plan: for example, we do not want to discourage the 
invincibles from using their insurance when they actually need it. 
Before fully explaining the concept and addressing this and other 
important issues, however, we first take a trip through life-insurance 
history, back to a time when insurance companies more openly 
acknowledged that they had to offer a little “spice” to get customers to 
buy their products.21 We then set out the details of our proposal, using 
behavioral decision research to explain the power of the tontine idea 
and to address some theoretical objections. 
I. TONTINE LIFE INSURANCE 
Tontine life insurance emerged in the United States in the mid-
nineteenth century and became a resoundingly successful alternative to 
traditional life insurance.22 A tontine life-insurance policy paid a 
deferred dividend to policyholders who timely paid their life insurance 
premiums for a specified period: ten, fifteen, or twenty years, 
depending on the policy that the applicant chose.23 People who died 
earlier would receive the stated death benefit, but they would not 
receive any share of the dividends. With this arrangement, a tontine 
life-insurance policy paid a cash benefit to customers who otherwise 
might think that they had lost their bet with the insurance company.24 
Before the advent of tontine policies, mutual companies paid 
dividends, but they credited the dividends against the next year’s 
 
 21. Historian Timothy Alborn quotes an early twentieth-century English 
insurer, discussing the “noble work” of selling life insurance, who suggests that “man 
is essentially a gambler, and it is this feeling that he may score off the insurance 
companies . . . that induces him to insure.” TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE 
INSURANCE AND BRITISH SOCIETY, 1800–1914, at 310 (2009). One broker advised that 
customers who were “fond of excitement” could be induced to buy insurance by a 
bonus scheme that added “a zest to life compared to which Kaffir Ketchup is insipid.” 
Id. (referencing kaffir limes, the leaves of which are used as a spice in Asian cooking). 
 22. See Sharon Ann Murphy, Life Insurance in the United States Through 
World War I, EH.NET, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/murphy.life.insurance.us (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2010) (“Estimates indicate that approximately two-thirds of all life 
insurance policies in force in 1905—at the height of the industry’s power—were 
deferred dividend plans.”).  
 23. See Manly, supra note 7, at 184. 
 24. ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310 (reporting that in 1891 “the Bankers’ 
Magazine attributed [the] popularity [of tontine life insurance] to ‘the element in human 
nature which disposes every individual to regard his own chances of life favourably’”). 
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premium, in effect lowering the price of the insurance coverage.25 This 
arrangement allowed mutual life insurance salesmen to collapse the 
insurance premium and the policyholder dividend into a single number 
when pitching their policies. Sheppard Homans, “the most prominent 
actuary in the country” in the mid-nineteenth century, recognized the 
explosive sales potential that lay in exploiting, rather than obscuring, 
the dividend.26 He saw that the dividend could be cut loose from the 
premium and then deferred to provide an enticing cash bonus for loyal, 
healthy customers. 
A company that deferred the dividends and then distributed them 
only to policyholders who had faithfully paid their premiums for twenty 
years would accomplish three very useful things. 
First, the company would make its life-insurance policy more 
attractive to men (and it was mostly men buying life insurance) who 
liked a little spice packaged with an otherwise dull purchase.27 Second, 
the company would give its agents an excellent answer to the prospect 
who objected that he was healthy and did not need life insurance.28 “No 
problem,” the agent could say, “our deferred dividends mean that you 
can back your own life, and you cannot lose. Either you die and your 
heirs emerge as the winner on your behalf, or you survive and we give 
you a cash payment at the end of twenty years—and, by the by, no need 
to let your wife or your creditors know about that little bonus.”29 Third, 
the company would gain “one of the best solutions to the problem of 
healthier lives lapsing at a higher rate than unhealthy ones—since 
‘backing one’s life’ required the continued payment of premiums.”30 In 
economic terms, the deferred dividend worked as an anti-adverse-
selection device. It appealed disproportionately to people who thought 
that they were low risk, and it kept them in the insurance pool. 
These new policies were called “tontine” life insurance policies 
because of their similarities to an investment scheme developed by 
Lorenzo Tonti in the seventeenth century and used by governments into 
the eighteenth century to raise money, and to finance private projects 
 
 25. See Gilbert E. Roe, The Insurance Investigation, in 3 THE MAKING OF 
AMERICA 459, 462 (Robert Marion La Follette ed., 1973) (reporting that the leading 
tontine life insurance companies had until 1868 paid dividends annually). The Equitable 
Life Insurance Company introduced tontines to the market in 1868. See Roger L. 
Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case 
of Stifled Innovation, 1868–1905, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 379, 380 (1987). 
 26. Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 380. 
 27. ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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well into the nineteenth century.31 In the original tontine, contributors 
pooled their funds and distributed the interest each year to the surviving 
members of the pool, with the last living member “taking the whole of 
the fund.”32 With tontine life insurance, all the members of the pool 
who faithfully paid their premiums and survived to the end of the 
predefined period split the fund. The tontine feature distinguished this 
life-insurance product from a similar, but less successful product called 
endowment life insurance, in which the amount of the deferred dividend 
was fixed in advance.33  
Tontine life insurance quickly swept the life-insurance field, and 
the mutual life-insurance companies selling tontine policies became the 
largest financial institutions of the day.34 At the same time, however, 
the millions of dollars that the companies accumulated during the 
deferral of the dividend proved too tempting to some of the managers 
of the leading firms. The result was a scandal and investigation in 1905 
that rocked the life-insurance industry more profoundly than anything 
since.35 One key result was the prohibition of tontine life insurance—not 
because there was anything wrong with such insurance in theory,36 but 
rather because tontines allowed the life companies to amass enormous 
reserves that led executives to public extravagance and gave them too 
 
 31. See generally Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491-521 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340062 (noting that “[a] tontine was also one of the 
options proposed by Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury to reduce the 
national debt of the United States at the beginning of the Republic”). The serial murder 
incentives posed by the tontine provided the plot for a story by Robert Louis Stevenson 
and his stepson, Lloyd Osbourne, The Wrong Box (The World’s Classics ed. 1954) 
(1889), which was made into a movie in 1966 (Columbia Pictures) (starring Michael 
Caine, Peter Sellers, and Dudley Moore, among others). 
 32. Manly, supra note 7, at 183. 
 33. See MERVIN TABOR, THE THREE SYSTEMS OF LIFE INSURANCE 29 (1900).  
 34. See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885–1910, at 
56 (1963) (“Nothing was more fundamental to the business growth of the Big Three, or 
more evocative of the values that governed them, than the deferred dividend policy.”); 
Murphy, supra note 22; Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 380 (reporting that “[i]t is 
generally acknowledged that the phenomenal expansion of the U.S. life insurance 
business over the next thirty years was largely driven by the popularity of tontine 
policies, helped along, perhaps, by the aggressive marketing techniques of the large 
firms”). 
 35. Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of 
the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 637 (1993) (describing the Armstrong 
investigation of the insurance industry as “the 1980s takeover wars, the junk bond 
boom, and the insider-trading scandals rolled into one sustained event”).  
 36. See KELLER, supra note 34, at 58 (describing deferred dividend policies as 
“[appropriate] . . . to their market and their time”). 
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much influence over the companies whose shares they purchased as 
investments for the reserves.37 
In short, tontine life insurance was so successful at vacuuming 
money out of consumers’ pockets and into insurance companies’ funds 
that states legislatures stamped it out as part of what Mark Roe has 
called the “1906 pacification of the insurance industry.”38 It was not 
until the late twentieth-century that the life-insurance industry was able 
to reassemble some of the tontine’s heady mix of prudence and 
speculation, in the form of the variable life and annuity insurance 
products that bundle insurance and investment and dominate the life- 
insurance market today. But the life-insurance industry never regained 
the economic control that tontines helped it gain in the late nineteenth 
century. 
For us, the payoff from this history lies in what life-insurance 
tontines teach about the sales potential of insurance that allows people 
to “back their own lives.”39 Ordinary health insurance, like ordinary 
life insurance, amounts to a bet against the health of the purchaser, 
since the insurance pays off handsomely only when something goes 
seriously wrong. The tontine feature changes that equation and thus 
should be especially enticing to people who think that they would lose 
the ordinary health-insurance bet—the invincibles. In effect, the tontine 
feature provides a hedge against the risk of paying what may, in 
hindsight, seem like pointless health-insurance premiums. 
 
 37. See H. Gerald Chapin, The Armstrong Amendments: A Synopsis of New 
York’s New Insurance Legislation, 14 AM. LAW. 389, 389 (1906) (reporting that 
section 83 of the legislation “requires that every policy issued on or after January 1, 
1907, contain a provision ‘that the proportion of the surplus accruing upon said policy 
shall be ascertained and distributed annually and not otherwise’”); Roe, supra note 25, 
467, 473–74 (arguing that the tontine-fueled reserves were “being used as a compact 
money power in the hands of five or six men to control the industries of the country” 
and urging the prohibition of tontine and related deferred dividend life insurance 
products); Roe, supra note 35, at 639. 
 38. Roe, supra note 35, at 639. Roe focused largely on the companion 
legislation prohibiting insurance companies from putting more than a small percentage 
of their reserves into stock, but observing that the legislation also “restricted sale of key 
insurance products, holding back . . . growth.” Id. at 670. See also Ransom & Sutch, 
supra note 25, at 380–81 (reporting that the Armstrong investigation led to the 
prohibition of tontine insurance). As Roe reports, the Armstrong investigation and 
resulting legislation “fragmented and pulverized the insurance industry,” which had 
been “on the verge of developing not into the passive institution [it] became, but into an 
institution that would vaguely resemble the powerful German universal banks or the 
main bank system in Japan.” Roe, supra note 35, at 639.  
 39. ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310. 
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II. TONTINE HEALTH INSURANCE: THE BASIC IDEA 
A tontine health-insurance policy would pay a deferred dividend to 
a policyholder who maintains his or her health insurance for a specified 
period—we suggest three years (an arbitrary number that could easily 
be changed based on market research). Significantly, the amount of the 
dividend would depend on the extent to which customers use the health 
insurance. The young invincibles who in fact turn out not to use very 
much insurance would share the dividend, while those who use more 
insurance would get their benefits from the policy exclusively in the 
form of the covered health care they received. 
The simplest arrangement would condition eligibility for the 
dividend on the participant not having consumed an aggregate dollar 
value of medical care above a pre-set threshold amount over the 
relevant period, perhaps with the cost of preventive care not counting 
against the threshold (in order to encourage preventive care). More 
complicated arrangements might require the participants to receive 
preventive care to be eligible for the dividend and, instead of a single 
three-year period, there might be annual or even quarterly periods, 
each subject to lower thresholds, offering participants the ability to lock 
in some dividend rights as long as they did not exceed the threshold 
during these shorter periods. In addition, the program might offer 
periodic lottery-like prizes to eligible participants to help address the 
problem of hyperbolic discounting. We will explore some of these 
design options after we discuss the economics of adding the tontine 
feature to health insurance. 
In behavioral economic terms, tontine health insurance takes 
advantage of the optimism bias that appears to be particularly prevalent 
among the young invincibles.40 In addition, the tontine feature frames 
the health-insurance purchase as a smart investment, rather than a way 
to spend money for something that the customer does not really need.41 
III. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF TONTINE HEALTH INSURANCE 
To an economist, the idea of using what amounts to a gamble to 
market health insurance has at least two strikes against it. 
First, the very idea of “marketing” insurance—if marketing means 
more than providing basic information on pricing and coverage—is at 
 
 40. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.  
 41. Cf. CHERIS SHUN-CHING CHAN, MARKETING DEATH: CULTURE AND THE 
MAKING OF A LIFE INSURANCE MARKET IN CHINA (forthcoming 2011) (describing how 
local insurance companies gained market share from foreign insurance companies by 
framing life insurance as an investment).  
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odds with standard economic theory. Someone who is rational, risk-
averse, and can buy insurance that is actuarially fairly priced,42 should 
always want to buy it and should not need additional inducements—a 
tontine “prize” or anything else—to “sweeten the deal.”43 However, the 
evidence we review below suggests that there are indeed many millions 
of Americans who have chosen not to buy health insurance that seems 
roughly fairly priced and within their means.44 This is insurance 
coverage they “should” want to purchase, according to standard 
economic theory, but they do not do so. It is this group of potential 
insureds who are the target of our policy proposal. We will shortly 
explore the size of this population, the possible explanations for its 
“insufficient” demand, and the problems that this poses for public 
policy. 
The use of bundled gambles to sell health insurance faces a second 
objection as well: why should bundling tontine prizes provide any 
inducement at all for someone to buy insurance? Insurance is ordinarily 
understood to be motivated by risk aversion, while gambling is 
motivated by risk preference.45 Since the two phenomena seem 
inconsistent (at least on standard accounts), people who find insurance 
attractive should have nothing to gain from adding an uncertain prize to 
their coverage. Indeed, a risk-averse individual should by definition 
 
 42. Actuarially fair insurance is that for which the premium is equal to the 
expected loss: an insured facing a one percent chance of a $100,000 loss has an 
expected loss of 0.01×100,000 = $1,000. If coverage for that risk costs $1,000, it is 
fairly priced. Of course, perfectly fair pricing is rarely available, since there are 
administrative costs to providing insurance, but fair pricing serves as a useful 
benchmark.  
 43. Indeed, one definition of what it means to be risk averse is that a rational 
risk averse individual will always purchase actuarially fair insurance for any loss. If the 
insurance is not fairly priced, it is not clear whether buying it would be welfare-
enhancing. In that case, inducing a rational actor to buy insurance through clever 
marketing tricks might well be welfare-reducing, since anyone who would have 
benefited from insurance would choose to buy it without the marketing. See LOUIS 
EECKHOUDT ET AL., ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER RISK 51 (2005) 
(explaining why a risk-averse individual will not want to purchase full insurance when 
that insurance is not actuarially fair). 
 44. We hasten to add that the many people lack health insurance not because 
they choose not to buy it when they could and rationally “should” do so. Rather, there 
are supply side problems (such as employers who do not offer insurance to their 
workers) and other factors that account for a substantial fraction of the uninsured. Our 
proposal is a modest one, whose goal is only to induce some fraction of the uninsured 
population to take up insurance at a relatively low marketing cost. 
 45. See, e.g., Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of 
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 289 (1948), who write that a risk-
averse individual “will never participate in a ‘fair’ game of chance . . . [because] the 
gain in utility from winning a dollar will be less than the loss in utility from losing a 
dollar, so the expected utility from participating in the game is negative.” 
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prefer a $1 cash discount on her insurance premium to tontine prize 
with a $1 expected value.46 Why, then, do “prizes” involving gambles 
(such as lottery tickets) seem to be an effective tool for marketing 
insurance in other countries?47 Why does the historical record reveal 
significant “gambling” elements in the marketing of insurance, until 
such practices were banned in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries? And why are probabilistic rewards (such as lottery tickets) an 
unusually effective motivational device in other contexts besides 
insurance?48 
 
 46. If the insured were not risk-averse, then they would presumably not find it 
attractive to purchase insurance, even with the lottery ticket thrown in. But see 
generally JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003) 
(stating an alternative motivation for health insurance, based on access to expensive 
care, rather than spreading financial risk). 
 47. For example, regulations permit, and several insurers actually use, prizes 
to market insurance in many Latin American countries. (It is worth noting that the 
tontine prize differs from a lottery prize, in that the purchaser of the tontine policy may 
believe that he has private information indicating the low nature of his risk and, thus, 
the payoff of a tontine will not be perceived to be random. Indeed, this is one of the 
appeals of a tontine to an optimist.) We have not found any instances of prizes for 
health insurance, but drawings for prizes (keyed to the national lottery) are used in 
Brazil, and insurers in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador also use prizes to market auto 
and/or life insurance.  
 Peter Zweifel analyzes a premium rebate program—used by two of the ten largest 
German health insurers in 1988—that was roughly homologous with our prize structure. 
Peter Zweifel, Premium Rebates for No Claims: The West German Experience, in 
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 323–46 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988). Zweifel employs a 
standard neoclassical model (without the over-optimism assumption we feature) to 
analyze the rebates. Although he does not consider the role of prizes in attracting the 
uninsured, he does find empirically that “rebate options [prizes] are more effective in 
restraining utilization of medical care in minor episodes of sickness than are . . . 
deductibles and/or coinsurance.” Id. at 325. 
 48. The use of probabilistic prizes as rewards for good behavior has been 
studied in several non-insurance contexts, and such rewards have been found to be 
highly effective in altering behavior, at relatively low cost. Since these studies were 
conducted with an eye towards efficacy, rather than causation, they do not say much, 
directly, about why probabilistic prizes should offer such strong incentives, but the 
results are certainly compatible with the kind of optimism bias we believe is 
characteristic of the invincibles. That is, subjects seem to over-value the probabilistic 
prize, relative to its actuarially-fair equivalent, presumably because their subjective 
assessment that they will win is higher than the true probability. See, e.g., Todd A. 
Olmstead et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Prize-Based Incentives for Stimulant Abusers in 
Outpatient Psychosocial Treatment Programs, 87 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 175 
(2007) (showing that “lottery tickets” for small prizes could create substantial 
incentives for drug addicts to comply with treatment protocols); Lorenz Goette & Alois 
Stutzer, Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment (IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 3580, 2008) (discussing rewards, in the form of lottery tickets, 
for donating blood led to increased donation rates, without lowering the “quality” of 
blood donors).  
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A. Who Lacks Health Insurance, and Why? 49 
Forty-seven million Americans did not have health insurance as of 
2008.50 As Jonathan Gruber notes, roughly 32 million of these 
uninsured persons were in families with incomes less than 200 percent 
of the poverty line.51 These people may be too poor to buy health 
insurance and are not the targets of our proposal, although some of 
them might nevertheless respond positively to it. Our audience is the 
remaining 15 million uninsured who are not poor or near-poor. Rather 
than looking at the uninsured by income, we can look by age. Thirteen 
percent of the non-elderly uninsured (those less than sixty-five years 
old) are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and just under 
one-third are between nineteen and twenty-nine.52 Of this group, 
roughly half have incomes greater than 200 percent of the poverty line. 
They are the special focus of our proposal. As Figure 1 illustrates, 80 
percent of people have insurance at age eighteen (presumably through 
their parents or through Medicaid), and nearly as high a percentage 
have insurance at age thirty, but in the intervening years, the proportion 
















 49. This section draws heavily on a recent and authoritative survey article by 
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 571 
(2008). Gruber points out that the number without health insurance at any point in time 
may be twice as large as the number without insurance over the course of an entire 
year, suggesting that there is substantial mobility between insured and uninsured status. 
Id. at 576. 
 50. Id. at 575. 
 51. Id. The poverty line for a family of four was $19,307 in 2004. For a 
single individual under age sixty-five, the poverty line was $9,827. U.S. Census 
Bureau, Poverty Thresholds 2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/ 
thresh04.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).  
 52. Kriss et al., supra note 2, at 2 fig.1. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Young Adults with and without Health 
Insurance53 
 
Gruber points out that surprisingly little is known about why those 
who can afford it choose to do without insurance,54 but he considers the 
following two major possibilities: adverse selection and behavioral 
foibles of the invincibles. 
1. ADVERSE SELECTION? 
Many of the uninsured cannot get insurance from their employer, 
and much health insurance available on the individual market is quite 
expensive. A superficially plausible story—albeit one with little 
supporting evidence55—is that individually purchased health insurance is 
expensive because of adverse selection. Those who choose to go 
without health insurance may be (unobservably) healthier than those 
 
 53.  Adams et al., supra note 3, at e1033, e1036 (based on data from 48,827 
responses to the National Health Interview Survey). 
 54. “[T]here are a variety of hypotheses for why so many individuals are 
uninsured, but no clear sense that this set of explanations can account for 47 million 
individuals.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 581. 
 55. “[T]here is surprisingly little work on . . . whether those who choose to 
be insured are adversely selected; the [only] two studies on this topic . . . reach mixed 




















Ins. full yr. Unins., full yr. Unins., part-yr. 
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who do buy it, and therefore find it unattractive to pool with the 
relatively sick who require high premiums.56 On this account, the 
uninsured make rational comparisons between the cost of insurance and 
their risk of illness, and when they find that insurance is over-priced 
(given their risk aversion and a realistic assessment of their own risk of 
illness), they choose to forego it. The evidence in support of this story 
is fairly weak, however, and a recent Kaiser Foundation report 
demonstrates that healthy young adults are actually more likely to be 
insured than their sicker counterparts, which is inconsistent with most 
adverse-selection models.57 
Moreover, there are low-cost health-insurance policies marketed to 
young people that appear quite affordable. For example, Tonik, a 
health-insurance plan marketed explicitly to young people (with a Web 
site featuring “hip” graphics, funky typefaces, and slang) and sold 
directly to individuals, offers a plan with a $5,000 deductible, $20 co-
pays for four in-network office visits per year (which are not subject to 
the deductible), and some benefits for prescriptions and vision expenses 
(also not subject to the deductible). The premium for California 
residents is quoted as “as low as $88 per month.”58 That represents an 
 
 56. If the healthy uninsured could credibly convey their health status to their 
insurers, competition would drive down their premiums. Id. at 576–77. But on this 
account, the healthy uninsured lack any means to distinguish themselves from the sicker 
people who do choose buy insurance, and so they must buy at an actuarially 
unfavorable rate appropriate for the sicker pool they would have to join. Id. at 577. 
However, the healthy uninsured may distinguish themselves by not buying—presumably 
there would be some health insurance package that would be worth their while, which 
would probably involve low premiums & high deductibles. See infra note 58.  
 57. The study finds that 73 percent of young adults in excellent or very good 
health have insurance, while only 60 percent of those in worse health do. SCHWARTZ & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 6. This does not seem consistent with an adverse selection 
story, under which it is the worst risks that should demand the most insurance. The 
complex relationship between selection and optimism bias is explored in Alvaro 
Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism, 97 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1994 (2007). In Sandroni and Squintani’s model, where some high-risk 
agents have incorrect perceptions of their own riskiness, many of the standard 
conclusions about selection no longer obtain. Id.  
 58. See Tonik, California, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ca/ (last 
visited May 17, 2009); Tonik, Georgia, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ga/ 
(last visited May 17, 2009). The Tonik Web site quotes premiums for similar coverage 
in the following states as follows: Colorado ($89), Connecticut ($145.83), New 
Hampshire ($150.18), and Nevada ($103). See Tonik, Colorado, Cover Your A-Z, 
https://www.tonik.com/co/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Tonik, Connecticut, Cover 
Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ct/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Tonik, New 
Hampshire, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/nh/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); 
Tonik, Nevada, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/nv/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2010). Note that the average individually insured eighteen to twenty-nine year old paid 
monthly premiums were approximately $120 in 2006–2007. See AHIP CENTER FOR 
POLICY & RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 2006–2007: A COMPREHENSIVE 
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annual premium of $1,056, only 4.7 percent of the annual income of a 
single person earning twice the poverty line,59 and less than the cost of 
auto insurance in many jurisdictions. Of course, whether Tonik is a 
good buy depends on one’s degree of risk aversion, one’s probability 
and cost of various types of medical treatment, the coverage Tonik 
provides, and the possibility of alternative (free) care for those whose 
medical bills exceed their assets. Nevertheless, at least as a first 
approximation, the existence of such policies suggests that at least some 
portion of the uninsurance problem for young adults remains 
unexplained by conventional economics. 
2. BEHAVIORAL FOIBLES: THE INVINCIBLES 
A second possibility is that the young uninsured may not be 
making reasonable judgments in the face of excessively high prices, but 
may instead be reacting irrationally in some fashion. A simple but 
appealing story is that they underestimate the probability that they will 
get sick and need health insurance, a kind of optimism bias that has 
been well-documented in many other contexts. Simply put, many 
people tend to have an unfounded belief that bad things will not happen 
to them. Such a belief, whether mistaken or not, obviously makes 
insurance less attractive—why pay to cover losses that you “know” you 
will not experience? 
Optimism bias can be formally defined as the tendency of 
individuals to believe that they are less likely to experience negative 
events (accidents, job loss, poor health) than the average person, and 
more likely to experience positive events.60 In an early study, Weinstein 
found that such a bias was widespread among college students for both 
positive and negative events.61 Weinstein also observed that the 
 
SURVEY OF PREMIUMS, AVAILABILITY, AND BENEFITS 7 tbl.2 (2007), available at 
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Individual_Market_Survey_December_2007.pdf. 
 59. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR 2008 BY SIZE OF 
FAMILY AND NUMBER OF RELATED CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh08.html (listing official 2008 
poverty threshold for a single person under sixty-five with no children as $11,201). 
 60. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806, 806 (1980).  
 61. Id. at 806–07, 813–14. Optimism bias has even been given a possible 
neurological basis: more optimistic individuals (as measured by a psychological test) 
were more likely to “expect positive events to happen closer in the future than negative 
events, and to experience them with a greater sense of pre-experiencing.” Tali Sharot et 
al., Neural Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, 450 NATURE 102, 102 (2007). In a 
neuro-imaging study, the parts of the brain that may be used to retrieve memories of 
past events in constructing representations of the future—in particular the rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex—were more likely to be activated in positive imaginings 
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“perceived controllability” was highly positively correlated with the 
extent of optimism bias: subjects tended to be more optimistic about 
events they believed they could control (contracting a venereal disease) 
than about those they thought were outside of their control (buying a 
car that turned out to be a lemon).62 
Other studies suggest an important reason why the young should 
be especially likely to experience optimism bias—they tend to lack 
relevant experience with negative outcomes. As one survey put it, 
Experience matters . . . . Drivers who have been hospitalized 
after a road accident are not as optimistic as drivers who have 
not had this experience. Similarly, middle-aged and older 
adults are less optimistic about developing medical conditions 
than their younger counterparts are, presumably because older 
persons have had more exposure to health problems and 
aging. Acutely ill college students (approached at a student 
health center) perceive themselves to be at greater risk for 
future health problems than do healthy students, indicating 
that risk perceptions can be “debiased” if the person has a 
relevant health problem. Acutely ill students, however, 
continue to be unrealistically optimistic about problems that 
do not involve physical health.63 
In health policy circles, the uninsured who choose to “go bare” in 
the belief that they will not get sick or be injured have a name: “The 
Invincibles.”64 Although there is no definitive study of this group, 
recent New York Magazine and Wall Street Journal articles are 
suggestive.65 The Journal reported that companies trying to market 
health insurance to young people found that such buyers were often 
uninterested in plans that offered bare-bones (major medical) coverage 
for premiums of $50 to $100 a month.66 “What came through loud and 
clear in focus groups . . . was that people did not see value in a 
[catastrophic coverage] plan with just a high deductible,” apparently 
 
(relative to negative ones) in those who scored higher on a measure of psychological 
optimism. Id. at 103. 
 62. See Weinstein, supra note 60, at 18 tbl.2. 
 63. David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, 
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 69, 80 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
 64. See, e.g., Amsden, supra note 1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Insurers’ New Target: Companies Go After 
the Uninsured with Cheaper Plans, Clever Marketing, but Benefits Are Sparser, WALL 
ST. J., May 31, 2005, at B1.  
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because they viewed such a plan as paying for something they would 
probably never use.67 
In order for the invincibles to be victims of optimism bias, they not 
only have to believe they will not get sick; they must also be wrong in 
their assessment of their own risk. Apparently, they often are. For 
example, “[o]ne in five uninsured young adults report that they were 
unable to get needed care due to cost, . . .[and] 18 percent . . . said 
they could not afford a prescription” within the past year.68 
Callahan and Cooper report similar findings based on the National 
Health Interview Survey,69 a representative nationwide sample taken 
between 1998 and 2001. Among respondents aged nineteen to twenty-
four, even after controlling for income, race, and gender, “the 
uninsured remained at significantly higher risk for reporting delayed or 
missed medical care, not filling a prescription because of cost, having 
no contact with a health professional, and having no usual source of 
health care, relative to privately insured peers.”70 The lack of insurance 
is a particular problem for young adults with chronic health 
conditions.71 In subsequent work, Callahan and Cooper demonstrate 
that those with chronic conditions who lacked insurance had six to eight 
times higher rates of unmet health-care needs because of cost, when 
compared to otherwise similar young adults who did have insurance.72 
When a young adult develops a chronic health condition, he may 
change his mind about the benefits of health insurance, but by then the 
low-priced policies offered to healthy young people will not be 
available. In sum, the blasé attitude about risks and costs that seems to 
characterize the invincibles appears to be factually unfounded: the 
invincibles may be healthier than the population average, but they are 
ultimately no less vincible then their insured peers.73 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. SCHWARTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 7. 
 69. Callahan & Cooper, Uninsurance and Health Care Access, supra note 3, 
at 89. 
 70. Id. at 88 (statistics omitted). 
 71. Callahan & Cooper, supra note 5, at 181. 
 72. Id. at 180. Although people who already know that they have a serious 
chronic condition are unlikely to find tontine insurance appealing, some of the young 
people with chronic conditions are likely to have developed those conditions only after 
“aging out” of dependent care coverage and, thus, would have been good candidates 
for the tontine health insurance. 
 73. Of course, there is a large and growing catalogue of deviations from fully 
rational behavior, and optimism bias is by no means the only possible explanation for 
the invincibles’ failure to purchase health insurance. We focus on this explanation 
because it seems to fit the stylized facts so well, and is so analytically tractable, but we 
recognize that other explanations may play some role in the underinsurance problem. A 
related type of irrationality is the tendency to “overvalue short-run insurance costs 
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B. Why Adding a Prize to an Insurance Policy Should Make it Less 
Attractive to Homo Economicus 
This Section explores the logic of the standard model of insurance 
demand and explains why a rational, risk-averse individual—an 
“Econ”—would always prefer a fair insurance policy without an 
actuarially fair prize to one that contained such a prize. 
To start, consider a rational, risk-averse, expected-utility-
maximizing individual who faces a loss L with known probability p. 
Since he is risk averse, his marginal utility of wealth falls as his wealth 
increases. Thus, the individual benefits (in utility terms) if he can 
reduce his wealth in the state of the world where wealth is high, while 
increasing his wealth in the state of the world where wealth is low. 
Moving a dollar from the high-wealth to the low-wealth state of the 
world leaves him better off because he is giving up low-marginal-utility 
dollars and getting back high-marginal-utility dollars, which are worth 
more in utility terms. 
Actuarially fair insurance is available when the premium charged 
is equal to the expected loss (pL), and any risk-averse individual should 
want full insurance if it is available at the fair price. Full insurance 
guarantees that the individual’s wealth is the same, regardless of 
whether the loss occurs; this means that the insured has maximized 
expected utility by equalizing the marginal utility of wealth in both 
states of the world (whether the loss occurs or not).74 That in turn 
implies that wealth itself should be equalized in the two possible states 
of the world, which is only possible if the individual buys full 
insurance. 
Now, consider adding a stylized tontine “prize” to this problem. 
(We can loosely define a tontine as any insurance policy that pays off 
both when the loss occurs and when it does not. The “prize” is the 
amount paid if there is no loss.) Under this arrangement the individual 
can pick an amount of coverage, I, under the same conditions as above. 
 
relative to [future] medical expenditure risk.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 577. This kind 
of myopia has been extensively analyzed by behavioral economists under the rubric of 
“time-inconsistency” or “hyperbolic discounting,” whereby individuals apply a steeper 
discount rate to long-term benefits than to short-term costs. The term apparently 
originated with George W. Ainslie. See G.W. Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 
J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 485 (1974). In this context, it can lead to 
essentially the same results as optimism bias. Rather than understating the probability 
that one will get sick and need benefits, a hyperbolic discounter applies too high a 
discount rate to these future benefits, and thus ends up undervaluing them in 
comparison to present costs.  
 74. The only way for the marginal utility of wealth to be the same in both 
states of the world is for wealth to be the same in both states, which implies full 
insurance. 
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In addition, though, the individual can also choose to receive an amount 
T if the loss does not occur (which happens with probability (1-p )).75 
The fair premium for this payment is (1-p )T, and just as with 
insurance, the tontine premium must be paid whether or not the loss 
occurs or the prize is awarded. 
As before, the individual still prefers full insurance. But what 
about the optimal size of T ? It should be clear that a risk-averse 
individual will not find paying a fair rate for a tontine prize (paid if the 
loss does not occur) to be in his interest. Doing so requires the insured 
to move dollars from the loss state, where he pays the tontine premium 
with dollars that are scarce (and thus worth more, in utility terms) to 
the no-loss state, where he receives the tontine prize in dollars that are 
plentiful (and thus worth less, in utility terms). Put another way, the 
prize adds financial risk, and should thus be abhorrent to a rational, 
risk-averse utility maximizer. 
C. Why Tontines Should Be Attractive to the Invincibles 
1. OPTIMISM BIAS LEADS TO UNDER-INSURANCE (OR NONE AT ALL) 
Instead of assuming that individuals have accurate perceptions of 
all relevant risks, consider an Invincible—someone who suffers from 
optimism bias. We can characterize this bias in many ways, but the 
simplest version is that for a loss that occurs with objective probability 
p, an Invincible assigns it a subjective probability of q, which is smaller 
than p. In making his insurance purchase decision, the optimistic 
individual will choose the amount of coverage to maximize expected 
utility given his subjective probability of loss, not the objective one. 
The objective probability, however, will still be used by the insurer to 
set the premium. 
 
 75. Of course, this amount T does not fall out of the sky. It must be paid for 
somehow. One possibility is that T is paid for out of additional premiums. That is, the 
insured might be charged an actuarially fair premium, p, to cover expected losses, and 
an additional amount to cover payouts in the event that there is no loss. So, for 
example, if p is 0.1, then the probability of no-loss is (1-p) = 0.9. Suppose the loss, L, 
is equal to 1,000 and the tontine “prize” T is equal to 10. Then the premium required 
to support the prize is (1-p)T = 0.9×10 = 9. Thus someone who bought the combined 
tontine policy would have to pay 0.05×1,000 = 50 for the insurance coverage and 9 
for the “prize,” for a total of 59. T might alternatively (or in addition) be paid for out 
of investment income earned by the insurance company on the “float” between the time 
when premiums are collected and the time when losses are paid out. But that 
complication does not add anything to the simple model we consider because if there 
were such a float, it could be used to reduce premiums below the actuarially fair level, 
were there no tontine element to support. 
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It is easy to show that someone characterized by optimism bias 
who faces an actuarially fair premium will choose to buy less than full 
insurance and may purchase none at all: this makes sense, since such a 
person sees less reason to transfer wealth from the no-accident to the 
accident state of the world. Invincibles do not appreciate the need for 
insurance, precisely because their subjective assessment of the 
probability of loss is too low. 
2. A PRIZE MAKES THE POLICY LOOK MORE ATTRACTIVE TO AN 
OPTIMIST 
Since the insurer is by assumption charging actuarially fair rates, it 
is not possible to lower premiums to induce the optimist to buy (more) 
insurance—that would mean the insurer could not collect sufficient 
premium revenue to cover its payouts and would earn losses (unless it 
received a subsidy).76 
However, a fairly priced tontine structure would break even for 
the insurer and, under some conditions, could induce optimists to buy 
insurance who would otherwise not want to do so. The reason is that 
the insurer needs to charge (1-p) per dollar of tontine prize awarded. 
The insured, however, expects to receive the prize with probability (1-
q), where by definition (1-q > 1-p). The gamble thus looks like a good 
deal for exactly the same reason (optimism bias) the insurance looks 
like a bad one. 
Although the insurance contract by itself will not be attractive to 
some invincibles, the perceived subsidy from bundling a prize should 
be enough to induce some of them to sign up for the prize/insurance 
combination. The reason is that the optimist’s under-assessment of the 
probability of loss is at least partially matched by his over-assessment 
of the probability of gain. The availability of the tontine “prize” 
balances out the invincibles’ unwarranted undervaluation of the 
insurance. In fact, tontine health insurance has a kind of “ju-jitsu” 
element to it, because it uses consumers’ very irrationality to induce 
them to make welfare-enhancing choices they would otherwise forego. 
It is important to be clear that adding the prize only works, in 
mathematical terms, if the wrongly perceived “extra” value of the prize 
is as large as the wrongly perceived “discounted” value of the 
 
 76. If the insurance is being sold with some load factor that makes premiums 
larger than is actuarially fair, it might be possible to lower the load factor, reduce 
premiums, and still allow the insurer to cover its costs. But it is difficult to imagine 
how society could force insurers to lower their costs. Given that such cost reduction is 
difficult to achieve, it is widely understood that the only way to make insurance more 
attractive to the uninsured without making it unprofitable to the provider is to subsidize 
its purchase. We suggest otherwise. 
BAKER AND SIEGELMAN - FINAL 7/9/2010 2:38 PM 
2010:79 Tontines for the Invincibles 101 
insurance. Suppose for example that the true probability of a $20,000 
loss is 10 percent, but the optimist mistakenly believes the probability 
to be only 1 percent. Even if full insurance against this loss can be 
purchased for $2,000, the Invincible will likely reject such insurance, 
believing it should cost only $200. Now suppose that the insurer 
bundles the fairly priced insurance with a tontine prize of $10,000 
(payable if the loss does not occur, which happens with 90 percent 
probability). The fair price for the prize alone is $9,000, and the fair 
price for the combination of prize and insurance is thus $11,000. 
Although the Invincible believes he is getting a good deal on the prize 
element (paying $9,000 for a perceived 99 percent chance of winning 
$10,000), he also believes he is getting a correspondingly bad deal on 
the insurance element; and since the “extra” value attributable to his 
optimistic assessment of the likelihood of winning the tontine prize 
($999) is smaller than the “discounted” value of the insurance ($1,800), 
the prize/insurance bundle is still unattractive. 
There are several reasons to think that, in practice, the 
prize/insurance bundle might be more attractive than this simple 
example suggests, however. The first reason is history. The 
prize/insurance bundle was tremendously successful in the life-
insurance context despite the same mathematical limitation described 
above.77 The second reason is that real insurance is not complete (most 
significantly because of deductibles), which reduces the wrongly 
assessed discounted value of the insurance that the prize needs to offset. 
Using the numbers from above, if we assume that the insurance covers 
only 80 percent of the loss, then the (wrongly) discounted value of the 
insurance will be $1,620 ($1,800-180). That is still more than $999, but 
the gap is smaller. Third, it is plausible that optimists may be loss-
averse as well as overly optimistic. They misperceive the risk, but they 
are still willing to pay some amount above the actuarially fair price of 
the risk that they do perceive, further reducing the discount that the 
optimist places on the value of the insurance; and they may even be 
risk-preferrers for small gambles, which of course makes the prize 
more attractive than it would be on purely actuarial grounds. Finally, 
the fact that insurance is socially desirable to purchase increases its 
perceived value even to an optimist, who presumably is just as 
motivated to do socially acceptable things as everyone else. 
So, for example, a young man might be willing to pay significantly 
more than what he perceives to be the actuarially fair price for health 
insurance, not only because he is risk-averse, but also because that will 
make his mother happy and make him feel responsible. He is not 
willing to buy the insurance as it exists today, because the price is just 
 
 77. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
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too far from what he thinks the insurance is worth, even considering 
risk aversion and social expectation, but the gap between the price and 
the willingness to pay is smaller than his optimism alone would predict. 
These other factors should not substantially impact the prize side 
of the equation. The loading charge for adding a prize element to health 
insurance should be close to trivial. Risk aversion does not appear to be 
symmetric, as the research suggests that humans have a taste for 
gambling as long as the stakes are not too large. Finally, his mother is 
not likely to care very much that he chose the insurance policy with a 
prize, especially if it is called something more socially acceptable. We 
will call the prize a deferred dividend, and market tontine health 
insurance as a tool that helps young people save for the future. His 
mother will like that and, we predict, so will he. 
D. Targeting, Efficacy, and “Bang for the Buck” Issues 
Given the political economy of health care and the widespread 
belief that we will need to publicly subsidize insurance for the currently 
uninsured, one legitimate concern for public policy is the size of such 
subsidies, and the extent to which they are directed towards those who 
currently lack insurance, rather than just making health insurance 
cheaper for those who already have it. Finding a way to make insurance 
more attractive to the uninsured, without “wasting” funds by making it 
cheaper for those who are already insured, is thus a difficult 
institutional design issue, as Gruber stresses. In his helpful analogy,78 
we can 
think about the uninsured as tuna and those who already have 
insurance as dolphins. The goal of environmentally conscious 
fishermen is to catch as many tuna as possible in their nets, 
while minimizing the number of dolphins who are 
caught. . . . If the uninsured tunas were swimming in a 
separate ocean than the insured dolphins, the problem would 
be minimized. And if the uninsured tunas greatly 
outnumbered the insured dolphins, then there would also be a 
minimal dolphin catch. But, in reality, the 47 million 
uninsured tunas mostly swim in a part of the ocean where 
there are 190 million privately insured dolphins, making it 
 
 78. Gruber, supra note 49, at 585–86. To the extent that one uses subsidies to 
alter behavior, any money directed towards those already engaged in the desired 
behavior is a waste. In tax policy, the problem of subsidizing pre-existing conduct 
while trying to create incentives for new behavior is known as “buying the base.” Id. at 
585. 
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difficult if not impossible for policymakers to design 
insurance nets to capture the tuna without pulling in the much 
more numerous dolphins. 
As Gruber points out, at every income level most people are 
insured.79 Thus, basing subsidies for health insurance on income would 
thus result in spending considerable sums on those who are already 
insured, while netting relatively few uninsured. 
Tontine health insurance can help to mitigate this problem for two 
reasons. First, allowing private insurers to bundle prizes with health 
insurance requires no governmental outlay at all! At least from a 
budgetary perspective, this is a zero-cost strategy for reducing 
uninsurance.80 Moreover, although tontines would catch some dolphins, 
they would be more attractive to the tuna we care about: the invincibles 
who have demonstrated that they are not willing to purchase an existing 
policy.81 And the dolphins captured by the tontine net would not be 
harmed. Indeed, from their perspective, the tontine option would be 
utility enhancing. 
IV. DESIGN OPTIONS 
If we are to be true to the tontine idea, then the payoff in the good 
state of the world should be a deferred dividend paid to people who did 
not otherwise use their insurance, rather than a monthly prize or other 
lottery for which all policyholders are eligible. Even limiting the 
product design in that way, there are still a wide variety of options. To 
explore those options, we ask a series of questions and offer some 
tentative answers. An actual tontine health-insurance product would 
obviously require extensive consumer research, for which our 
discussion is no substitute. Instead, our goal here is to describe some of 
the ways that a tontine health-insurance product could be designed and 
to highlight some of the more important choices involved in the design 
process. 
 
 79. Id. at 586. 
 80. It is important to remember that budgetary outlays are not an end in 
themselves, and that a true welfare analysis is substantially more complicated. 
 81. In this respect at least, a tontine prize is like other aspects of insurer-side 
selection. See, e.g., Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Risk Adjustment in 
Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 
1055 (2000) (pointing out how HMO coverage can be designed to select for certain 
groups). For example, bundling a health club membership with premiums is likely to be 
especially attractive to young, healthy, low-risk insureds; offering excellent oncology 
care has the reverse selective effect.  
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Analytically, the components of a tontine policy are the eligibility 
threshold (what it takes to qualify for the prize), the size of the prize 
itself, the duration of the eligibility period, and the size of the 
premium. Of course, these are not completely independent parameters: 
for example, the choice of a threshold and a prize amount will 
determine the premium the insurer must charge to break even. 
A. Eligibility 
1. THE EXPENSE THRESHOLD 
How should we think about the health-care expense threshold that 
will be used to condition eligibility for the dividend? Setting a precise 
number will require technical assistance from a health-insurance 
actuary, but there are judgments involved that have marketing and, in 
some cases, even public-policy consequences. For example, should the 
threshold be set relatively low so that fewer people can get larger 
dividends, or should it be set higher so that more people get relatively 
smaller dividends? In general we are agnostic with regard to this and 
subsequent questions. We prefer whatever product design works, in the 
sense of being most appealing to people who do not buy traditional 
health insurance. But it is possible that setting the threshold too low 
might in some cases discourage participants from getting care that they 
need. We address this concern shortly. 
2. DURATION OF ELIGIBILITY PERIOD 
How long should the deferred dividend period be? Answering this 
question requires more granular information than we have about health-
insurance purchasing patterns. If the period is too short, the dividend 
will not appear enticing enough. If it is too long, the hyperbolic 
discounting that is likely to be another characteristic of the young 
invincibles will make the dividend appear too small. Moreover, people 
may think that they will never be able to collect, perhaps because they 
will assume that they will eventually get a good job that includes good 
health-care benefits. This last issue brings us directly to our next 
question. 
3. ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Should eligibility for the dividend be conditioned on something 
other than the health-care expense threshold? For example, should 
eligibility for the dividend depend on the policyholder having received 
designated preventive care? For us, once again, the best answer is 
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whatever the marketing research reveals to be most popular. We predict 
that simpler plans will work better, and that conditioning eligibility on 
preventive care smacks of the paternalism that the young invincibles 
reject. Many of the same public-health benefits sought by mandating 
preventive care may be gained by exempting preventive care expenses 
from counting against the threshold, and by marketing preventive care 
as the smart thing to do to stay healthy enough to get the dividend. 
(Indeed, as we plan to explore in subsequent work, the deferred-
dividend concept could well allow a more socially acceptable form of 
managed care.) 
B. Payout Size 
Should the deferred dividend be fixed in advance? Or should it 
depend on variables such as the percentage of policyholders who are 
eligible for the dividend at the time of distribution? If it is not fixed, 
what are potential variables, and what is at stake with regard to each? 
Here we predict that a variable dividend would out-perform a fixed 
dividend, by recruiting the optimism bias to magnify the predicted size 
of the dividend that the invincible participant believes he will receive. 
A variable dividend also works better from an actuarial perspective by 
reducing the risk to the insurance company. The tontine idea suggests 
simply dividing the dividend pie by the number of the people eligible 
for the dividend. It would be interesting to take that idea a step further 
and make the size of the pie depend on the profitability of the pool. We 
predict that young adults would not like this last variation because they 
would not trust health-insurance companies’ computation of profits, 
but, once again, market research should produce a more reliable answer 
than our intuitions. 
C. Other Considerations 
1. INTERACTION WITH EMPLOYEE-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 
How should tontine health insurance interact with employment-
based health benefits? We conceived of tontine health insurance as an 
individual market product, not something that would be offered as an 
employment benefit (but we could imagine that deferred dividends 
could play an important role in managing moral hazard in the 
employment context, as we plan to explore in subsequent work). Our 
current focus in the relationship between tontine health insurance and 
employment-based benefits lies in alleviating the young invincibles’ 
legitimate concern that they might not qualify for the dividend because 
they will find a good job, with good benefits, before the deferred-
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dividend period is up. To address that concern, we suggest the tontine 
policies offer participants the ability to cash out their dividend rights if 
they exit the plan to purchase an employment-based policy for which 
they recently became eligible. In addition, we are intrigued by the 
possibility of offering the option of retaining the deferred-dividend 
participation rights if the participant enrolls in an employment-based 
program run by the same company as the company running the health 
insurance tontine.82 
2. INVERSE MORAL HAZARD? 
Under what plausible circumstances might a participant’s concern 
about exceeding the health-care expense threshold lead him or her to 
forgo incurring a health-care expense and suffer adverse health 
consequences as a result?83 What could be done to address that 
problem? Again, we take no firm position on this important issue, 
preferring to leave the question to future experimentation. We do note 
that economists almost universally believe that the low deductible 
coverage provided by virtually all health-insurance plans is overly 
generous because it encourages (ex post) moral hazard and over-use of 
insurance, but provides relatively little of the consumption-spreading 
benefits that (allegedly) motivate insurance purchases in the first place. 
Martin Feldstein’s design for optimal insurance, for example, would 
involve a 50 percent co-payment for expenses up to 10 percent of the 
insured’s income, with full coverage thereafter.84 In short, there may be 
good reasons to discourage “over-use” of health insurance (while, of 
course, lowering premiums). If so, the tontine element could be 
designed to serve this function by appropriately calibrating eligibility 
for the “prize” to the amount of use. More complicated prize functions 
could exempt certain kinds of health-care expenditures (e.g., preventive 
medicine such as routine checkups, flu shots). Usage-based restrictions 
 
 82. This possibility offers one way to forge the kind of long term relationships 
between consumers and health insurance companies that make investments in preventive 
care valuable to insurance companies. At present, people are free to switch insurance 
plans each year, and enough do that insurance companies cannot be sure that they will 
realize the benefit of investing in preventive care. 
 83. Richard Derrig pointed out to us that there is good evidence of inverse 
moral hazard in the Massachusetts safe-driver plan. For accidents that are only slightly 
higher than the insured’s deductible, people engage in “roadside settlement” so as to 
avoid having a claim show up on their records and raising their future premiums. 
Personal Communication with Richard Derrig, NBER Insurance Conference, 
Cambridge, Mass. (May 2009). 
 84. See Martin S. Feldstein, A New Approach to National Health Insurance, 
23 PUB. INT. 93, 103 (1971). Feldstein’s plan also featured a basic deductible of 5 
percent of income. See also Gruber, supra note 49, at 578–79.  
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on prize eligibility might be accompanied by lower co-pays if it were 
unnecessary to use both of these methods to discourage overuse. 
Shorter eligibility periods with vested dividend rights could be another 
answer to the concern about inverse moral hazard. With shorter 
periods, going to the doctor only risks the dividend rights from the 
current period, not the rights to the entire three-year deferred dividend. 
On the other hand, the easier the dividend is to get, the more people 
will get it, and the smaller and therefore less enticing it will have to be. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION: A CALIBRATED EXAMPLE 
In this Part, we consider a back-of-the-envelope empirical 
implementation of a tontine health-insurance policy. We envision the 
tontine element bundled with an ordinary health-insurance policy (as 
sold on the individual market), rather than being priced separately. Our 
calculations are meant to give a rough sense of how much the tontine 
add-on might be expected to raise premiums and what kind of “prizes” 
could be offered. 
We rely on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data 
for 2006 to calibrate the relevant parameters.85 We divide the 
population of uninsured eighteen to twenty-nine year olds by gender, 
but do not attempt to differentiate them any further. We assume a 
tontine period of three years, and further assume that the rate of return 
on invested premiums is just equal to the load factor, allowing us to 
ignore these issues.86 
Our tontine policy consists of four parameters, of which any three 
can be chosen by the insurer. We define: 
T = size of tontine prize at the end of three years. 
τ = monthly premium collected to support the prize 
Θ = threshold for spending over the previous three years that 
defines eligibility for the tontine prize.87 
 
 85. For MEPS data, see Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Summary Data 
Tables, http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables.jsp.  
 86. The administrative expenses associated with running the tontine should be 
very low, since the policy would be piggy-backing on—and indeed, would be bundled 
with and indistinguishable from—ordinary individual health insurance. There might be 
some fixed costs associated with setting up the software to keep track of eligibility, but 
marginal costs should be quite low. On the other hand, because the product is new and 
rather unusual, it might require more involvement by sales agents, at least in early 
years. 
 87. For instance, if Θ = $2,000, those individuals who spend less than $2,000 
over three years are eligible for a rebate at the end of that period. 
BAKER AND SIEGELMAN - FINAL 7/9/2010 2:38 PM 
108 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
p = F(Θ) = probability that an insured is eligible for the 
prize (i.e., spends less than the threshold amount), where F is 
the empirical cumulative distribution function for health care 
expenditures by individually insured policyholders of a given 
gender, ages eighteen to twenty-nine, as calculated from the 
MEPS data. 
To close the model, we simply assume that competition among 
insurers drives the expected payout to equal the total monthly premium 
collected, or 
p(Θ)T = 36τ. 
Selection issues are, of course, of paramount importance in the 
provision of insurance. An important feature of the tontine policy, 
however, is that it has precisely the reverse selection effect from 
ordinary insurance—the tontine is most attractive to the individuals who 
think they are the healthiest (since they are most likely to expect to 
receive the end-of-period rebate). To account for moral hazard, we 
calibrate health-care usage, and hence the threshold and prize amounts, 
based on the insured population of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds. 
That is, we assume that the uninsured will have the same utilization as 
the currently insured. (To the extent that the uninsured who would be 
motivated to buy a tontine health-insurance policy are healthier than the 
currently insured because of adverse selection, this imparts a 
conservative bias to our utilization estimates.88) 
We do not account, however, for “inverse moral hazard,” created 
by the incentive that the tontine provides to under-utilize insurance. Of 
course, the advantage of bundling a tontine with an ordinary health-
insurance policy is that deliberate underutilization of the insurance to 
secure eligibility for the prize creates a benefit to the insurer. But 
consider someone facing a $500 expenditure threshold and a prize of 
$1,000. At the margin, a reduction in spending of $1 earns $1,000 by 
putting the person below the threshold, while the insurer saves $1 and 
pays out $1,000. In other words, if there is “bunching” at the 
threshold, the insurer’s savings in covered expenses may be outweighed 
by the additional payouts for prizes to those falling below the threshold. 
 
 88. A more problematic assumption relates to the correlation of health care 
expenditures across years. Since the MEPS data do not permit one to track individuals 
for three years, we assume in constructing our estimates that health care usage is 
independent across years. To the extent that this is not true, the threshold may need to 
be lower to achieve the same T. This uncertainty is yet another reason to promise a 
deferred dividend that is based on a share of the dividend pool, rather than a specific 
amount. 
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One solution, in keeping with the design of the original tontines and 
with modern variable annuities, might be to make the prize a share of 
the total deferred dividend: the more shares, the smaller the dollar 
value of each individual’s share of the dividend, and vice versa. 
Alternatively, we could use percentile rather than dollar thresholds to 
qualify for the prize. That is, instead of specifying that those spending 
below, say, $500, are eligible, one could instead limit eligibility to the 
lowest-spending 10 percent of all insureds.89 Both solutions transfer the 
risk of inverse moral hazard to the insureds themselves. For ease of 
exposition, our numerical examples here use fixed prizes. The decision 
between fixed and variable prizes for an operating tontine health-
insurance plan should be based on market research. We favor whatever 
works. 
According to a report by AHIP, the average monthly premium of 
eighteen to twenty-nine year olds in the individually insured market was 
about $120 in 2006–07.90 We consider monthly premiums τ, of $10, 
$25, and $50, and eligibility thresholds (Θ) of $250, $500, $750, and 
$2,000. This yields a 3×4 matrix of possible prizes that could be 
offered, consistent with the insurer’s breakeven constraint, which we 
display in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for various Monthly Premiums 




Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ
$250 $500 $750 $2,000 
$10 $878 $720 $643 $493 
$25 $2,195 $1,800 $1,607 $1,223 
$50 $4,390 $3,600 $3,214 $2,466 
 
 89. If, for example, 20 percent of insureds spent nothing, then the prize could 
be given randomly to only half of those 20 percent, or the prize amount could be cut in 
half. 
 90. AHIP CENTER FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 7 tbl.2. The 
survey covered almost 2.3 million individual market policies, of which over 555,000 
were issued to policyholders between eighteen and twenty-nine years of age. Id. The 
$120 figure represents the weighted average premium for the eighteen- to twenty-four- 
and twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-old groups. Id. These premiums are in the same 
range as the Tonik premiums. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 91.   The authors’ calculations in Table 1 are based on MEPS data for N=1376 
men ages eighteen to twenty-nine, for 2006. “Premium” is for the tontine element only 
and excludes the premium for insurance itself. See supra note 85 and accompanying 
text. 
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The key fact that underlies Table 1 is the relatively low utilization 
rate of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men. For example, 41 percent 
of insured eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men reported spending less 
than $83 on medical care in 2006 (less than $250 over three years, on 
our assumptions). This means that the prize that can be awarded for 
spending less than $250 over three years is only (1/0.41) 2.4 times the 
total premium collected. As the threshold gets larger, the percentage of 
participants qualifying for the prize necessarily gets larger, so a $10 per 
month premium can only support a $493 prize if the threshold for 
eligibility is spending less than $2,000 over three years. Since women 
in the MEPS data set are more likely to use care than men, the 
corresponding prizes for women are larger by a substantial degree: at 
the $250 threshold, the prize for women is 100 percent greater than for 
men, falling to about 55 percent greater at the $2,000 threshold. 
Table 2 takes the tontine prize amount as given at $5,000, and asks 
what combinations of monthly premia and eligibility thresholds would 
finance this payout. 
 
Table 2: Eligibility Threshold for a $5,000 Tontine Prize (T), for 
various Monthly Premia92 (eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men 
only) 






A premium of $10 per month represents $360 in total premiums 
over three years. Since we know we will pay out $5,000 to those who 
qualify, it follows that we are looking for a threshold (Θ) at roughly the 
(360/5000) seventh percentile of the health-care utilization distribution. 
In fact, roughly 20 percent of insured men ages nineteen to twenty-nine 
had no health-care expenses at all in 2006, so the threshold is $0 for 
both $10 and $25 premia. To award a $5,000 prize therefore requires 
 
 92.  See supra Table 1. 
 93.  Since about 20 percent of those surveyed reported $0 expenditures, the 
$10 premium permits only about one-third of eligibles to collect the $5,000 prize; the 
$25 premium permits about 90 percent of eligibles to collect. A randomization 
procedure would be required to determine which of the eligibles would collect. 
 94.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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some sort of randomization for any premium below about $28/month. 
For example, at a $10/month premium, only about one-third of those 
with no spending could actually receive a $5,000 prize. The similar 
figures for women place the seventh percentile at $0, the eighteenth 
percentile (corresponding to $25/month premium) at $165, and the 
thirty-sixth percentile at $1,077. 
Table 3 examines the possibility of exempting “preventive care” 
from counting against an insured’s expenditures for purposes of tontine 
eligibility. As we discussed earlier, it would make sense from a policy 
perspective to encourage insureds to undertake preventive care such as 
vaccinations, routine checkups, and so on. An obvious way to do this 
would be to exempt such expenditures from counting towards the 
tontine threshold. MEPS does not classify expenditures by “preventive” 
versus “other,” so we adopt an extremely crude definition of what 
constitutes preventive care: for these purposes, “preventive” 
expenditures are everything except emergency room and in-patient 
hospital expenses. 
 
Table 3: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for Various Monthly Premiums and 




Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ´ (Excluding 
“Preventive Care”)96
$250 $500 $750 $2,000 
$10 $409 $406 $400 $384 
$25 $1023 $1015 $1001 $959 
$50 $2043 $2029 $2002 $1919 
  
Men use less “non-preventive” care than total care, of course, so 
the prize that can be offered for a given premium and threshold is 
smaller when “preventive” care does not count towards eligibility. 
Comparing Table 3 and Table 1, the prizes that can be offered to men 
for a given premium are about 50 percent to 75 percent as large if we 
exclude everything but emergency room and in-patient expenses. The 
male-female gap in “non-preventive” care is smaller than for total care 
expenses, with the result that eliminating “preventive” care from 
counting towards the eligibility threshold substantially lowers the size 
of the prize available to women, cutting the amount by more than two 
thirds for the lowest threshold. 
 
 95.  See supra Table 1. 
 96.  “Preventative” care assumed to include everything but expenditures on 
emergency room and in-patient hospital care. 
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Finally, we consider a scenario that attempts to account for 
selection. The tontine will be least attractive to those uninsured with the 
highest expected health-care utilization, since they are least likely to 
qualify for the prize. (Of course, these are precisely the people who 
would have been most likely to sign up for insurance already, but 
suppose for some reason they failed to do so.) Table 4 shows what 
happens if the tontine policy were not attractive to this group. As 
compared with Table 1, feasible prizes are about two thirds to three 
quarters as large, because instead of, for example, 41 percent of all 
insureds spending less than $250 over three years, 63 percent do (once 
we have eliminated the top 10 percent of all spenders). 
 
Table 4: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for Various Monthly Premium 
Amounts and Spending Thresholds97 (eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-




Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ98
$250 $500 $750 $2,000 
$10 $574 $479 $433 $367 
$25 $1,435 $1,198 $1,803 $917 
$50 $2,871 $2,397 $2,166 $1,835 
VI. IF HEALTH TONTINES WOULD BE SO EFFECTIVE, WHERE ARE 
THEY? 
One short answer is that something like a health tontine is already 
being marketed in China, where the Ping An Life Insurance Company 
recently began selling “policies that combine life, accident, 
hospitalization, critical disease, endowment, and dividend 
components.”99 Like insurance companies in other developing 
countries—including the U.S. in the nineteenth century, and Japan in 
the mid-twentieth century—Chinese insurers have found that deferred 
dividends appeal to the insurance-resistant.100 Private, supplemental 
 
 97.  See supra Table 1. 
 98.  Assumes that the highest-utilizing 10 percent of uninsured do not sign up 
for coverage, and that their spending would be equivalent to that of the 10 percent 
highest-using insureds. 
 99.  See Cheris Shun-ching Chan, Creating a Market in the Presence of 
Cultural Resistance: The Case of Life Insurance in China, 38 THEORY & SOC’Y 271, 
294 (2009). 
 100. See Chan, supra note 41, at epilogue (detailing the history of life 
insurance in Japan).  
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health insurers in Europe have also offered deferred dividend health 
insurance plans, suggesting that health tontines can appeal to consumers 
in developed countries as well.101 
A longer and admittedly more speculative answer to this question 
revolves around the longstanding effort to separate insurance from 
gambling, a related commitment among insurance practitioners to an 
understanding of insurance that leaves little room for “spicy” insurance 
products, the self-conscious transformation of health-insurance 
companies into health-care companies, and lingering (but misplaced) 
concerns about the legality of tontines. 
A. Separating Insurance from Gambling 
Until Parliament passed the Gambling Act in 1774, it was possible 
and indeed common to purchase insurance on a stranger’s life in Great 
Britain.102 Such insurance came to be condemned as gambling, and the 
Gambling Act was part of an effort to separate insurance from other 
sorts of speculation that continue today, as represented by the current 
controversies over credit default swaps and stranger-owned life 
insurance.103 
Many states in the U.S. adopted the Gambling Act’s insurable 
interest requirement, which prohibited the purchase of insurance on a 
life or property in which the purchaser did not have an interest.104 Even 
with this legal fence between insurance and gambling in place, 
nineteenth-century bankers still derided insurance as gambling, on the 
grounds that the insurance payoff depended on a random event—death, 
in the case of life insurance—rather than the slow and steady 
 
 101. See Zweifel, supra note 47; Peter Zweifel, Bonus Options in Health 
Insurance, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992. (Thank you to H.E. Frech for bringing the 
European experience to our attention.) 
 102. See GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695–1775, at 49, 62–63, 89–90 (1999) (concluding that the 
prudential aspect of life insurance did not succeed the speculative aspect until at least 
1850). 
 103. See Derivative Markets Transparency & Accountability Act, H.R. 977, 
110th Cong. § 16 (1st Sess. 2009) (proposing insurable interest requirement for credit 
default swaps); Sarah Quinn, The Transformation of Morals in Markets: Death, 
Benefits, and the Exchange of Life Insurance Policies, 114 AM. J. SOC. 738, 740 
(2008) (investigating “questions of wagering, speculation, and trust” in the secondary 
market for life insurance). Cf. Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce 
Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843, 844 (1931) (exploring the difficulty of distinguishing 
between hedging and speculation). 
 104. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 274 (4th ed. 2007) (providing a non-exhaustive list of states). 
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accumulation of savings.105 Insurance entrepreneurs responded to this 
charge in a variety of ways: drawing analytical distinctions (gamblers 
seek gains while insurers seek protection against loss),106 pointing to the 
good reputation and high standards of people in the insurance 
industry,107 and publicizing their efforts to exclude the immoral from 
the insurance pool.108 
Nevertheless, the gambling charge clearly struck home. Indeed, 
some prominent insurance industry leaders mounted that same charge 
against tontine life insurance.109 While these insurance men surely 
would not accept the “gambling” label for a lump-sum payment made 
upon the fortuity of the death of a particular insured (i.e., the death 
benefit), they were willing to apply that label to a lump-sum payment 
that depended on the fortuity of the number of people who died before 
the deferred dividend was paid. As inconsistent as that position may 
have been in theory, this internal critique from within the insurance 
industry played an important part in the early twentieth-century reform 
of the mutual life insurance business. 110 
When reformers sought to pacify the powerful mutual life 
insurance companies that profited from tontine life insurance, they used 
all the rhetorical tools at their disposal—including the conceptual link 
between tontines and gambling. When the reformers succeeded in 1906, 
they outlawed tontine life insurance, and their victory story recounted 
 
 105. See, e.g., A.B. Johnson, The Relative Merits of Life Insurance and 
Savings Banks, 25 HUNT’S MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COM. REV. 670, 671 (1851) (arguing 
that “life insurance assimilates with gambling” and that “we should provide for these 
purposes by self-denying accumulations”—in banks such as those he operated, of 
course). 
 106. See, e.g., George W. Savage, Origin and Nature of Fire Insurance, 4 
HUNT’S MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COM. REV. 159, 160 (1841) (“Insurance is, in reality, 
nothing more than a wager . . . but in a moral point of view, it should be considered 
entirely different.”). 
 107. See, e.g., H.S. TIFFANY, TIFFANY’S INSTRUCTION BOOK FOR FIRE 
INSURANCE AGENTS 20 (1883) (“This business is not a mere lottery or game of chance, 
but an honorable one in which some of the most experienced men of the age are 
engaged, and in which millions of dollars are invested.”). 
 108. See VIVIAN A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 72, 96–97, 110–11, 117 
(1979); cf. Quinn, supra note 93, at 741 (“[T]he spirit of insurable interest . . . 
established the decency of life insurance . . . because it kept the insurance from being a 
gamble . . . .”). 
 109. See KELLER, supra note 34, at 57 (“Deferred dividends became a special 
target of insurance men opposed to the corporate values of the great companies.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Jacob L. Greene, Letter to Editor, Facts About Tontine: The 
Alleged Enormity of the Wickedness, N.Y. TRIB., May 9, 1885 (“[T]he Tontine 
principle in life insurance is absolute, unqualified gambling . . .”); Manly, supra note 
7, at 183–87. See generally CONN. MUT. LIFE INS. CO., PAPERS RELATING TO TONTINE 
INSURANCE (1885–86).  
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the earlier debased nature of the insurance industry and the morally 
superior forms of life insurance that remained after the Armstrong 
investigation’s “ordeal of corporate sackcloth and ashes.”111 To this 
day, the fact that some life insurance companies did not participate in 
the “tontine affair” of late-nineteenth-century life-insurance industry 
remains a point of pride among their employees.112 
B. A Cultural Commitment to Insurance as a Risk-Management 
Technology 
When the sociologist Cheris Shun-ching Chan investigated the 
Chinese life-insurance market in the early 2000s, she was initially 
surprised at the success of inexperienced, undercapitalized local 
insurers in their competition with well-capitalized, experienced Western 
insurers in the Chinese market. She concluded that the local insurers’ 
inexperience actually gave them an advantage, because they were more 
willing to provide what their customers wanted: life insurance that paid 
deferred dividends.113 The foreign insurers’ experience had taught them 
that life insurance was “really” about managing the risk of premature 
death, and that life insurance was not a good savings or investment 
product.114 Yet their Chinese customers did not want to talk or even 
think about premature death.115 Instead they wanted to accumulate 
money to live the comfortable old age that precedes a good death. So 
they preferred to buy the financially insecure, but more culturally 
resonant products offered by the upstart local companies. Eventually, 
the foreign insurers caught on, and began offering similar products.116 
 
 111. KELLER, supra note 34, at 275. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE 
UNDERWRITERS 58, 61, 65 (1906) (address of Young E. Allison) (describing the poison 
of tontine life insurance and explaining that the results of the Armstrong investigation 
will be to “take [the] element of gambling out” of life insurance and restore it to “the 
highest gospel of co-operative organization that ever was preached”); see generally 
BURTON J. HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1907) (recounting the events 
leading up to the Armstrong investigation as a “thirty years’ war” between “the good 
and the bad in life insurance” concluding with the triumph of Jacob Greene—the 
“good” anti-tontine leader who lost in market share but won in principle—over Henry 
Hyde—the “bad” purveyor of tontines who won in market share but lost his reputation). 
 112. Personal Communication with Robert Googins, former General Counsel 
of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company.  
 113. See Chan, supra note 99. See also Cheris Shun-ching Chan, Honing the 
Desired Attitude: Ideological Work on Insurance Sales Agents, in WORKING IN CHINA: 
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF LABOR AND WORKPLACE TRANSFORMATION 229, 229–46 (2007); 
Chan, supra note 41.  
 114. See Chan, supra note 99.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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Although this is a difficult claim to document, we think that U.S. 
health insurers are even more committed to insurance as risk 
management than U.S. life insurers.117 The Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
plans grew out of efforts by doctors to provide financing for hospital 
care, and their leadership always resisted being considered part of the 
insurance industry.118 Although the big commercial U.S. health insurers 
like Aetna and CIGNA mostly grew out of the life-insurance business, 
the primary connection between the life and health businesses in those 
companies was a shared commitment to selling group policies to large 
corporate customers. Group life insurance, like group health insurance, 
is marketed in the U.S. exclusively as a risk-management product, not 
as a way to accumulate savings. Aside from this shared marketing, the 
life and health divisions in a commercial insurance company have little 
to do with each other, and the designers of the health-insurance 
products do not think of themselves as being in the same business as 
more “spicy” asset-accumulation life-insurance products. Accordingly, 
both the Blues and the commercial insurers share an understanding of 
health insurance as a health risk-management and risk-spreading 
product, not an instrument of accumulation. 
C. The Transformation of the Health-Insurance Industry into a Health-
Care Administration Industry 
The transformation of the traditional indemnity health-insurance 
product into the plethora of managed care products that dominate the 
health insurance market today has made a health insurance tontine even 
less thinkable for an executive at an Aetna, CIGNA, United Health, or 
a Blue. Today, health insurance is about the administration of health 
care, and many people in the industry would deny that they are in the 
insurance business at all.119 The more health insurance becomes a 
business of delivering and managing health care, the less plausible the 
tontine feature will seem to a health-insurance company executive. 
Indeed, the tontine feature highlights the messy, morally ambiguous 
history of the insurance business, just the kind of thing that the health-
care financing industry MBAs and MDs are running away from as 
quickly as they can. 
 
 117. Cf. Quinn, supra note 103, at 742 (“Just as a geological formation bears 
the traces of the environment that sculpted it, so too does a market bear the imprint of 
the social currents that shaped its development.”). 
 118. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1984).  
 119. See Email from John Day, former Chief Health Counsel, CIGNA, to Tom 
Baker (Feb. 18, 2009, 05:44 PM EST) (on file with author) (further explaining that the 
vast majority of the health-insurance business today is administrative, with other parties 
bearing much of the risk).  
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The recent efforts that some health-insurance companies have 
made to develop new products that would be more appealing to the 
young invincibles provides a useful illustration of the disconnect 
between the young invincibles’ preferences and the health-insurance 
industry’s assessments.120 The marketing materials for the new policies 
reflect the need for some spice. There are snappy graphics, fast cuts on 
Web pages, and slang drawn from extreme sports.121 But the products 
are just stripped-down managed-care policies that offer less coverage 
for a lower price.122 These bland products may appeal to people who 
are not buying insurance because they need the money to pay the rent, 
but they are not going to appeal to people who do not think that they 
need health insurance. The invincibles will reason—correctly—that they 
are even less likely to “collect” under the stripped down policies. 
D. Lingering Concerns about the Legality of Tontine Insurance 
We have identified three potential legal concerns about insurance 
tontines, none of which would apply to a properly designed health 
tontine. First, state insurance codes commonly prohibit insurance 
rebating, which is the practice of refunding to customers some or all of 
their premiums or providing some other benefit to them (other than 
insurance) in return for their premiums.123 This might seem to present a 
serious legal objection to a tontine. On close analysis, however, the 
objection melts away, because the statutes explicitly permit rebating 
that is “plainly expressed in the insurance contract.”124 Moreover, 
tontines are not the kind of agreement that the anti-rebating statutes 
were designed to discourage, since they do not threaten the solvency of 
the company or agents’ commission rates, and there is no covert 
discrimination between similarly situated policyholders. 125 
 
 120. Fuhrmans, supra note 66. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Spencer L. Kimball & Bartlett A. Jackson, The Regulation of 
Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 141, 146–47 (1961). 
 124. Robert H. Jerry II & Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the 
Negotiation of Insurance Agent Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under 
State Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775, 783 (1990) (discussing a greatly 
influential Model Act promulgated by The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) in 1947). As of 1990, forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia had an anti-rebating statute (California passed but later repealed a statute), 
and forty-seven of those states have modeled their statute directly on the Model Act, so 
there is general uniformity in anti-rebating laws among the states. Id. at 775. 
 125. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, “it is obvious that the 
object of [the anti-rebating statute] is to outlaw ‘unfair treatment of prospective 
insurants of the same class by offering inducements to one person that are not available 
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Second, New York and many other states passed legislation 
immediately after the Armstrong investigation that prohibited life-
insurance tontines.126 Significantly, this legislation applies only to “life 
insurance companies,”127 and not to health-insurance companies (which 
did not exist at the time of the 1907 legislation). Moreover, the primary 
objective of this anti-life-tontine statute was to prevent life-insurance 
companies from using the deferred dividends to accumulate large 
surpluses over long periods, tempting insurers to engage in financial 
manipulation, a concern that would not apply to a health-insurance 
tontine.128 
Third, states closely regulate games of chance and gambling, and 
there might be some concern in light of insurance history that tontine 
health insurance could be characterized as being in part a game of 
chance or a lottery.129 In our judgment these laws would not apply to 
health tontines any more than similar laws would have applied to life-
insurance tontines. A health tontine is not a true lottery or game of 
chance. The participants’ right to the dividend would depend on their 
own health experience: precisely the sort of legally permissible 
 
to all persons of the same class.’” McDowell v. Good Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 154 
A.2d 497, 500 (1959) (quoting In re Insurance Rebate, 19 Pa. D. 567, 569 (Pa. Atty. 
Gen. 1909)).  
 126. See Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 381.  
 127. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4231 (McKinney 2007). Policyholder’s participation 
in surplus of life insurance companies: 
(a)(1) Except as herein otherwise provided, every domestic life insurance 
company shall ascertain and distribute annually, and not otherwise, the 
proportion of any surplus accruing upon every participating insurance 
policy and annuity or pure endowment contract entitled as hereinafter 
provided to share therein, issued on or after the first day of January, 
nineteen hundred seven. 
 128. See id. § 4231(a)(3) (McKinney 2007). See also id. § 4231 note 2. 
 129. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 7 (LexisNexis 1992) (Lotteries: 
Disposal of Property by Chance):  
Whoever sets up or promotes a lottery for money or other property of 
value, or by way of lottery disposes of any property of value, or under the 
pretext of a sale, gift or delivery of other property or of any right, privilege 
or thing whatever disposes of or offers or attempts to dispose of any 
property, with intent to make the disposal thereof dependent upon or 
connected with chance by lot, dice, numbers, game, hazard or other 
gambling device, whereby such chance or device is made an additional 
inducement to the disposal or sale of said property, and whoever aids either 
by printing or writing, or is in any way concerned, in the setting up, 
managing or drawing of such lottery, or in such disposal or offer or attempt 
to dispose of property by such chance or device, shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than three thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not more than three years, or in jail or the house of correction for 
not more than two and one half years. 
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contingency that lies behind traditional health and life insurance, albeit 
in an opposite direction. And the amount of individuals’ dividends 
would depend on the health experience of the group as a whole: 
precisely the sort of legally permissible contingency that lies behind 
traditional mutual insurance dividends. 
CONCLUSION 
Our positive thesis is that there is a significant and identifiable 
group of individuals—the invincibles—who do not buy health insurance 
they can afford and “should” want. They wrongly believe that the 
insurance is not worthwhile, since nothing bad will happen to them, a 
form of optimism bias. Our normative recommendation is that health 
insurance should be reformulated so as to make it more attractive to 
these invincibles by taking advantage of their optimism. By bundling 
health insurance with a deferred dividend or “prize,” insurers should be 
able to entice this group to buy coverage they would not otherwise 
choose to purchase. Prizes have historically been used to sell life 
insurance in much this way, with great success. 
But is this a good thing? Why should we “trick” people into 
buying insurance they would not otherwise want?130 We think that the 
case for doing so is actually quite strong, although we recognize not 
everyone will be convinced. First, there are possible externalities at 
play when the uninsured fail to secure care for communicable diseases, 
although efforts to quantify them suggest that the magnitude of these 
externalities is small. The uninsured also rely heavily on the public fisc 
to pay for the care that they do receive, but the amount of 
uncompensated care is quite small compared to total health-care 
expenditures, so the fiscal externality is not large. The strongest 
argument comes from the evidence that a significant number of young 
adults who lack insurance are hampered in their ability to seek medical 
care, relative to those who are insured. So there is a plausible 
paternalistic rationale for getting the invincibles enrolled in health care 
for their own good.131 As noted earlier, moreover, our proposal only 
works because it appeals to the invincibles’ optimism bias. Anyone who 
is rational and immune to the bias should not find tontine health 
insurance attractive. Thus, we can be fairly confident that whoever is 
“tricked” into buying under our proposal suffers from a cognitive 
 
 130. As Jonathan Gruber perceptively notes, “the simple fact that so many are 
without insurance is not necessarily a cause for public-policy intervention; many more 
individuals do not own their own homes or are obese.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 581. 
 131. Gruber concurs, suggesting that “the major motive for caring about the 
uninsured is paternalism.” Id. at 582. 
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illusion that impairs their potential claims to be the best judge of their 
own interests. 
Tontine health insurance has an additional advantage over other 
plans to cover the invincibles: it would be much less coercive than 
insurance mandates, and much less costly than subsidizing insurance to 
make it cheap enough to be attractive.132 Even those who disagree with 
the idea of extending coverage to the invincibles would presumably 
agree that whatever coverage we do provide should be done as cheaply 
and as light-handedly as possible. Tontine health insurance meets those 
objectives. 
The time has come, we think, to revive the tontine, a nineteenth-
century insurance innovation that capitalizes on some fundamental 
truths about human nature to design better insurance. 
 
 
 132. One insurance blogger recently wrote that: 
[U]nless the gummint [sic] makes it more painful to not buy coverage than 
to do so, people are more likely to ignore any such requirement. We saw 
this in Massachusetts, where folks who failed to play along lost an 
exemption worth about $200. Compared to potentially thousands of dollars 
for insurance premiums, who can blame them? Young, healthy people 
aren’t stupid : if you don’t hurt them in the wallet, a lot of them are just 
going to say “the heck with it.” 
Henry Stern, Mandated Missteps, INSUREBLOG.BLOGSPOT.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://insureblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/mandated-missteps.html.  
